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Overcoming Naturalism from Within:
Dilthey, Nature, and the Human Sciences
Abstract: Dilthey’s middle works offer alternative strategies for interpreting the
debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism. These works traced the limits
of natural scientific methods in the face of the felt reflexivity of the subject,
the singular nexus of the individual’s life, and the epistemic inability to compre-
hend life as a universally valid whole. Dilthey naturalistically critiques claims
appealing to an uninterpreted immediate givenness and the direct self-access
and self-evidence of uninterpreted “inner experience,” while minimalistically
confronting naturalism with the reflexively felt, interpretively processed, and re-
flectively conceptualized and mediated character of the given. Lived-experiences
are complex relational wholes, involving purposiveness, which cannot be re-
duced to discrete “natural” elements abstracted from the life-nexus. Naturalism
is the primary orientation of modern science; yet the contents of life and the ob-
jects themselves call us to methodological differentiation and the articulation of
reality in more complex and multifaceted ways.
I Introduction
Wilhelm Dilthey’s epistemic project is to a certain extent “naturalizing,” as his
Neo-Kantian, phenomenological, and later hermeneutical critics have noted.
At the same time, it is “anti-naturalistic” according to the positivistic and scien-
tistic reception of his works. It is ironic that a holistic thinker of the self-gener-
ative interconnected “life-nexus” [Lebenszusamenhang] has been identified in
this reception with a dualistically (mis‐)construed reification of the distinction
between nature [Natur] and spirit [Geist], and explanation [Erklärung] and under-
standing [Verstehen].
In this essay, I suggest a more complex and nuanced approach to Dilthey’s
thinking of nature and spirit that reveals his current relevance to ongoing de-
bates between proponents of naturalism and anti-naturalism by reconsidering
the mediated nexus of nature and history articulated in Dilthey’s works, partic-
ularly the writings of the 1890s that are closer to a naturalistic and positivistic
perspective without embracing it. I argue that Dilthey’s project is more coherent
than his naturalistic and anti-naturalistic critics have proposed. Such a reconsid-
eration of Dilthey’s project offers a significant alternative strategy for responding
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to the opposition between naturalism and anti-naturalism that continues to in-
form contemporary philosophy.
Beginning with the naturalistic perspective presupposed by and established
in the modern natural sciences, the “fact of science” that is the point of depar-
ture for Neo-Kantianism and positivism, Dilthey immanently unfolds its scope,
possibilities, and limits in relation to the psychological, historical, and ethical
life-contexts of concrete embodied individuals. He does so without relying on es-
sentialist religious or metaphysical conceptions of being, ideal validity, or an un-
changing self. Dilthey not only accepted the validity of the modern natural sci-
ences, he sought to clarify and justify them by historically and anthropologically
contextualizing them. Nature and history do not necessarily indicate the elimina-
tion of knowledge and truth in relativism and skepticism, as Husserl feared in his
polemical “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”; they are its contexts and conditions
as Husserl later emphasized in a line of thinking that culminated in The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.¹ Without these life-proc-
esses, and the emergence of the cognitive from the non-cognitive, and rationality
from the life-nexus, there would be no science as a socially constituted practice
of knowing or as the human enactment of truth.
II The Promise and Crisis of Naturalism
Dilthey’s attention to natural science and writings about the historical formation
of the modern natural sciences and the naturalistic life-comportment are under-
emphasized.² In these writings, such as his account interpreting the constitutive
role of Stoicism in the formation of early modern natural philosophy, Dilthey
helped pioneer the history of science as a philosophical enterprise.³ Dilthey’s
this-worldly and historical justification of the sciences, and corresponding trans-
formation of the modern project of epistemology, critically traced the extent and
limits of scientific knowledge in the life-nexus and context.
 Husserl 1981; Husserl 1970.
 In addition to works on the emergence of modern science, Dilthey discussed contemporary
natural scientific developments in review essays published in DGS volumes 15– 17. References
to Wilhelm Dilthey’s works are to: Gesammelte Schriften, 28 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru-
precht, 1914–2011 (cited as DGS); English translations are from Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works,
ed. R.A. Makkreel and F. Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985– (cited as SW).
 See the essays in DGS 2; on Dilthey’s account of the transition to modern science and mod-
ernity, see Frohman 1995.
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Dilthey’s rethinking of the epistemology of the sciences required their social-
historical contextualization; the sciences are rethought in relation to their psy-
chological, anthropological, and natural conditions that are embedded and
enacted in historically mediated forms of life yet irreducible to pure historicity.
In the context of the natural-historical finitude of human life, Dilthey contested
reified visions of human reason with the felt self-relational reflexivity [Innewer-
den] of the self, the singular individuation of natural and historical life in an in-
dividual life, and the inability of humans to fathom and comprehend the whole
of life as an integrated universally valid metaphysical system.
Dilthey’s critique of historical reason revealed the conditional on-going proc-
ess character of knowledge and the one-sidedness of the claims of the natural-
istic worldview. The idea of truth in the naturalistic worldview that orients nat-
ural scientific inquiry has no theoretical limits in the continuing practice of the
natural sciences. The natural standpoint enters into crisis and aporia when it is
illegitimately extended beyond its experiential life-contexts and reified as a met-
aphysical world-system independent of its life-nexus.⁴
Dilthey’s double strategy naturalistically contextualized epistemic claims in-
volving an appeal to what transcends experience and the categories of life enact-
ed through experience, while hermeneutically resituating claims about nature
and naturalness. He rejected the naïve empiricism and intuitionism that entail
appeals to a non-interpreted immediate givenness. For Dilthey, there is no access
to experience independent of the mediation of expression and understanding;
the direct self-access and transparent self-evidence of an uninterpreted intuition-
ist “inner experience” or an unmediated empiricist “sensuous experience” prove
to be illusory. In contrast to vulgar life-philosophy and growing irrationalist ap-
peals to a pure stream of life without the mediation of words and concepts,
which Dilthey would challenge with a scientific conception of life-philosophy
for the sake of life that cannot live without knowledge, Dilthey noted how con-
cepts and intuitions are inappropriately separated from their life-contexts.
Through the overextension and abuse of both reason and intuition, lived-expe-
riences are fixated and dynamic life-perspectives become reified metaphysical
world-pictures.
Dilthey’s critical defense of naturalism is a limited and conditional one in-
sofar as he resituated naturalistic claims vis-à-vis the subject in the experience.
Dilthey’s epistemic subject is a situated, experiential, and embodied one within
the life-nexus. Insofar as it involves more than being an impersonal product of
natural and social forces, this experiential subject requires a “weak transcenden-
 On Dilthey’s hermeneutical empiricism, see Nelson 2007.
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tal” argument. Dilthey liberalizes the naturalistic thesis through this completely
conditional yet still significant and meaning-creating self. Due to Dilthey’s mod-
erate nominalism and experientialism, Dilthey minimalistically reinterpreted
Kantian a priori transcendental categories as conditionally enacted and contex-
tually embodied life-categories [Lebenskategorien]. Dilthey confronted natural-
ism, as the exteriority of worldly causal relations, with the reflexively felt and in-
terpretively mediated character of the phenomenally given and the factical in the
lived-experiences of an individual life that is experienced as my own.
The experiential hermeneutical perspective of an individual life cannot dis-
regard or escape the natural causal relations with which it is entangled. This con-
tingent self, as the individuation of meaning in the midst of its natural and social
conditions, cannot be coherently and adequately reduced to, or reconstructed as,
a discrete set of “natural” elements abstracted from the complex life-nexus. In
the co-givenness of self and world, spirit and nature, to be a self is to have a
world “there-for-me.” The world, as a relational nexus of significance, presup-
poses its being-there for someone. The individual is ineffable from the perspec-
tive of the natural standpoint. It is the individual person as a living ethical reality
that is the other defining feature of modernity and the primary focus of the
human sciences in Dilthey’s historical analysis.
Despite the role of the ethical individual in the human sciences, naturalism
is the primary methodological orientation for all modern science. Yet it is ex-
posed to a dialectic that results in dogmatic metaphysical theses and explosive
aporias that force its liberalization. The naturalistic standpoint is caught in per-
plexity and crisis in being extended to ethical life and challenged with issues of
value, purpose, and meaning that it cannot appropriately address. It is the con-
texts and contents of life—as mediating nature and spirit—that motivate the
methodological differentiation of the sciences and the articulation of reality in
more complex and multifaceted ways.
III Dilthey and Naturalistic Positivism
Dilthey’s name is invoked in Anglo-American contexts in conjunction with the
idea—articulated by C.P. Snow—that the natural sciences and humanities consti-
tute two distinct cultures. Dilthey is understood as a radical dualist in this dis-
cussion and this remains the predominant way of construing his distinction be-
tween interpretive understanding in the human sciences and causal explanation
in the natural sciences. Moreover, Dilthey has been interpreted as proposing the
supremacy of one culture over the other within philosophical discourses.
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One reading of Dilthey identifies his project’s basic tendency as in some
sense “naturalizing” and “positivistic.” Although this judgment might appear
peculiar, Dilthey himself affirmed the family affinity between these two move-
ments—along with materialism—as developmental variations of a common “nat-
ural standpoint” or “natural worldview.” Dilthey not only noted their affinity
with and resonance with one another but with his own critical empirical project
that also begins with the fact of the modern natural sciences. Broadly construed,
the naturalistic standpoint encompasses a guiding commitment to a non-super-
natural and scientific conception of the world. Naturalism is transformed into
natural scientific positivism, according to Dilthey, when the critical standpoint
of the phenomenal character of the physical world is recognized.⁵ The positivist
turn in the modern natural sciences entails that naturalism and materialism as
doctrinal metaphysical systems or theses about reality are abandoned.
Dilthey’s later hermeneutical critics maintain the continuity between Dilthey
and scientism.⁶ Heidegger claimed that Dilthey’s differentiation of two varieties
of sciences, natural and human, remains a positivistic distinction. It is derivative
of the more original question of being [Sein] as such and as a unified whole in
contrast with the ontic investigation of beings as entities [Seiende]. Gadamer
maintained that Dilthey was trapped between the scientistic methodologically
reductive conception of the world and the romantic experience of an affectively
moved and felt vital individuality.⁷ Because of his affinity with positivism, Ga-
damer has stressed how Dilthey remained a student of Comte and Mill as well
as of Goethe and Schleiermacher. This characterization of Dilthey makes little
sense if “naturalistic positivism” is defined in the limited sense of, in Croce’s
words, “the enemy of everything spiritual and historical.”⁸ An expanded and his-
torically fairer exposition of positivism, one that allows us to productively and
critically clarify Heidegger and Gadamer’s portrayal of Dilthey, is that it is natu-
ralistic and positivistic in the sense that it encompasses: (1) the critique of meta-
physical conceptions of reality for the sake of encountering and investigating re-
ality in its empirical givenness and phenomenality and (2) the epistemic priority
of the methods, models, and results of the modern natural sciences. Dilthey en-
dorsed the former thesis while modifying the latter one with a broader concep-
tion of science that encompassed the natural and social-historical world.
 DGS 5, p. 403.
 On Dilthey and positivism, see Sommerfeld 1926; on Heidegger’s analysis of Dilthey’s positi-
vism as the culmination of metaphysics, see Gander 1988.
 Gadamer 2004, p. 214.
 Croce 1941, p. 129.
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In another variation of this criticism, developed in Georg Simmel and adopt-
ed by Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, Dilthey could not overcome the last
residues of naturalistic biology and universalistic anthropology by adequately
historicizing and socializing human existence.⁹ This restraint is intentional.
Dilthey opposed the historical school’s one-sidedness as much as reductive nat-
uralism. Dilthey’s anthropological dimensions were critiqued by historicizing
thinkers on the right and the left. In an early response to Dilthey’s criticism of
the notion of a folk soul [Volkseele], or collective agent, Simmel contended
that there are no real individuals for the same reasons that Dilthey used to con-
clude that there are no real collective entities. The collective and the individual
are equally constituted products of natural conditions and social forces.¹⁰ Sim-
mel proposed that this position, Dilthey’s hermeneutical o individualism is left
unnamed, was a positivism that inconsequentially stopped short in the face of
the myth of the person.¹¹
IV Dilthey and Anti-Naturalism
A second way of reading Dilthey has made his thought the target for proponents
of the thorough naturalization of the human sciences and everyday life. Dilthey
appears as a major antagonist of scientific naturalism from Otto Neurath’s po-
lemical assessment to Mantzavinos’s Naturalistic Hermeneutics. According to
this argument, Dilthey cannot successfully prove that the human and natural
sciences are discrete autonomous unities and that this thesis dangerously under-
mines the unity, coherence, and integrity of the sciences.¹² Dilthey is read as
placing inherent limits on the progress of positive scientific knowledge and re-
jecting a naturalistic conception of the world for one inhabited by biographical
persons, felt and conceptual motivations, social groups, cultural patterns, polit-
ical institutions, and other mythical folk-concepts. Dilthey’s differentiation of the
human sciences consequently places them outside the realm of legitimate scien-
tific inquiry. The expanded notion of rationality and science promoted by Dilthey
inevitably leads to irrationality and anti-science for these critics. This positivist
criticism is echoed in Marxist materialism; Lenin and Lukács depicted Dilthey
 On Benjamin’s reading of Dilthey’s as an anthropologically based and naturalistic opponent
of radical historicity, see Hanssen 2000, p. 53.
 Compare Udehn 2001, pp. 68–74.
 Udehn 2001, pp. 68–74.
 Neurath 2006, p. 285; Mantzavinos 2005.
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and Weber’s justification of interpretive understanding [verstehen] in the human
sciences as a higher obscurantism and non-clerical form of idealism.¹³
There are earlier suspicions concerning the meaning and implications of in-
terpretive understanding, which is the elementary stumbling block for Dilthey’s
science oriented commentators. Theobald Ziegler warned in the late 19thcentury
of a “dictatorial Ignorabimus” (“we will not know”) that he proposed stemmed
from Dilthey’s interpretation of Augustine. Dilthey emphasized Augustine’s artic-
ulation of an irrational subjective interiority and ineffable individuality that can
only be comprehended through an intuitive felt understanding. Such a feeling-to-
feeling transmission between persons cannot be reproduced and thus endangers
the objectivity and rationality of science.
A disagreement concerning Dilthey’s import for the sciences is evident in the
von Mises brothers. The Austrian school economist Ludwig von Mises accepted
Dilthey’s methodological individualism, criticized by Simmel, and the incalcula-
ble character of life in the 1920s in his confrontation with Neurath’s conception
of socialist calculation. The logical positivist Richard von Mises maintained,
however, that ignoramus et ignorabimus—the “we do not know and will not
know” that Emil Du Bois-Reymond introduced in a 1872—is a consequence of
Dilthey’s differentiation of explanation [erklären] and understanding [verste-
hen].¹⁴
Walter Pollack and Georg Misch argued against the claim that understanding
the finitude and conditionality of cognitively established theoretical knowledge
as entailing an obscurantist prohibition on further research and inquiry.¹⁵ Dilth-
ey rejected in his discussions of Du Bois-Reymond’s thesis the idea that there are
intrinsic limits to scientific inquiry even as he argued that the sciences are inter-
nally differentiated and varied by their objects of inquiry.¹⁶ The scope and unity
of science are not to be dogmatically limited from outside; the sciences are dif-
ferentiated through the multiplicity that constitutes the empirical world. Dilthey
would consequently agree with Haeckel’s critical reply—Impavidi progrediamur
(“advance fearlessly”)—to Du Bois-Reymond’s ignorabimus and Virchow’s re-
stringamur, while disputing positivistic claims about the import of the sciences
within everyday life.
In a Literaturbrief from 1876, Dilthey describes how Du Bois-Reymond’s the-
sis is as unscientific as the dogmatic scientific materialism that it opposes.¹⁷ The
 On Dilthey’s relationship with Marxism, see Rockmore 1992, p. 212.
 Mises 1968, p. 209.
 Pollack 1907, p. 119; Misch 1947, p. 49.
 Pollack 1907, p. 119.
 DGS 17.
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current configuration of the scope and limits of the sciences can and will be re-
drawn. Crises and alternative hypotheses and theories reconfigure the scope and
limits of scientific knowledge. However, inclining toward Hume’s argumentation
concerning what theory and scientific theory can achieve, and prefiguring Car-
nap’s distinction between science and ethics, Dilthey concluded that there are
no internal limits to science in its own domain yet, even if every question
could be scientifically resolved into natural laws, the riddles and tasks of prac-
tical life would still remain unanswered.¹⁸
Jürgen Moltmann argued that Dilthey did not advocate obscurantism in re-
sponse to science and reason. Dilthey identified a scientistic obscurantism in
the disregard of historical life, and delusion that truth is gained independently
of its intersubjective conditions.¹⁹ Their ahistorical lack of vision resembles the
priestly princes of metaphysics who refuse to acknowledge the constitutive
role of the affective, the subjective, and the individual that are the conditions
of both life and knowledge. No desires and sentiments run through the veins
of their knowing subjects and such subjects are constitutively incapable of living
and knowing. The thesis that reason is grounded in sentiment and historical life
is another argument with precedents in Hume’s philosophy of common life.
Misch maintained that Dilthey adopted the same phenomenalist epistemic
basis as the positivist advocates of the natural sciences, whilst reinterpreting
its significance. There can be in Dilthey no “we will not know” that limits proc-
esses of intellectual development.²⁰ There is only a reasonable recognition that
we cannot know in an absolute “royal” way. This pluralist claim cuts against
both reductionistic naturalism and anti-naturalism. Insofar as anti-naturalism
assumes a royal route to truth through intuition, dialectic, or abstract reason,
it commits the same error as its opponents.²¹
There is a suggestive alternative conception of nature and spirit in Dilthey.
Ermarth describes him as an idealist inculcated “with a considerable dose of nat-
uralism.” But more adequately, as Dilthey did not idealistically deny natural and
social exteriority, others stress Dilthey’s intermediate and mediating role in these
disputes.²² Dilthey articulated an expansive and liberal in contrast with a cramp-
ed and illiberal naturalism; one encompassing value, validity, and the ideal as
 On Carnap’s relationship to Dilthey and Heidegger, see Nelson 2012 and Nelson 2013a.
 Moltmann 1971, p. 60.
 Misch 1947, p. 49.
 Harrington contends that Dilthey cannot be assimilated to either naturalism or the anti-nat-
uralism of Husserl and Neo-Kantianism in Harrington 2001. Compare the arguments for a com-
mon anti-naturalism in Jalbert 1988.
 Keller 1895: 126.
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the content of consciousness in accordance with a scientific- and person-orient-
ed principle of phenomenality [Satz der Phänomenalität] in which nature and the
world are not neutral and impersonal but “there-for-me.”²³
V Nature and Spirit
In a late short retrospective piece, his “Draft for a Preface” (1911) for a collection
of his epistemological and psychological writings, Dilthey noted that the domi-
nant positivist model of the natural sciences had “truncated the spiritual-cultur-
al world” by transforming it into a mere folk-illusion.²⁴ This illusion—from the
perspective of mere natural material relations—is, however, not a groundless il-
lusory projection but functionally real in how individuals live. The most reduc-
tive naturalist and materialist presuppose the practices of the human world
and the enactment, expression, and understanding of human life. All sciences
presuppose this life-nexus. But it is this practical life-context, which has been
bracketed by the natural sciences, that allows human scientists to recognize
the individual self in its sociality and its productive creative relations with the
whole of its life.
Dilthey revealed the aporias of constitutive idealism and its problematic in-
tellectualist and representationalist assumptions about mind and reality, argu-
ing that life is given through its phenomenality. Yet life is not merely a phenom-
enal appearance constituted by an empirical much less an ideal consciousness.
It is significant for someone. Whereas only nature comes from nature, life in its
relational tensions and living actuality is “there-for-me.” Life is given as a com-
plexly mediated productive nexus that can form awareness, meaning, and value
for itself. This relationally emergent life is in need of words and the cultivation of
its relational capacities for expression. As such, life is not immediately or intui-
tively given to itself. It is reflexively aware, which is “the most simple form in
which psychic life can appear.”²⁵ The simple and elemental is already reflexively
relational and mediated. That is to say, it must be understood and interpreted
through its expressions, objectifications, and practices. There is no knowledge
of a world independent of perception and lived-experience, which provide the
context and actuality for idealism’s consciousness and naturalism’s material na-
ture.
 DGS 5, p. 90; SW I, pp. 245–246.
 SW II, p. 2.
 DGS 19, p. 66; SW I, p. 254.
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The naturalizing approach to reality based on a materialistic understanding
of the natural sciences continues to be the prevailing tendency of our time de-
spite the anti-naturalistic calls to re-enchant the world and the theological
turn in some forms of recent philosophy. The anti-naturalistic distrust of the sci-
ences is scrutinized by Dilthey in the same preface. Dilthey maintained that it is
not modern science and its successes that are the problem but the triumph of a
narrow conception of scientific method over science.
Despite the limitations and dogmatic overextension of positivism, and thus
of the naturalistic worldview as a metaphysical doctrine about the totality of the
world, Dilthey articulated the empirical dynamic of knowledge while rejecting
positivism’s speculative opponents, “who tore thought away from sense-percep-
tion.”²⁶ According to Dilthey, both positivism and Kantian inspired critical em-
piricism are correct to stress both experience and its limits, since the natural
and historical empirical conditions and contexts of life cannot be transcended
even as further articulation and evaluation pushes individuals beyond the fac-
tuality of real conditions.
In contrast to the one-sided reduction of life to biological and physiological
instincts, drives, and the senses that are its natural basis or to the activity of a
non-sensuous spirit or constitutive consciousness, Dilthey proposed a suggestive
alternative strategy: to “understand life on its own terms,” immanently interpret-
ing it from out of itself—without eliminating its fullness for the sake of one of its
elements—and bring it through its felt reflexivity, methodological interpretation
and inquiry, and self-reflection [Selbstbesinnung] to reflective cognition and val-
idity about itself.²⁷ To this extent, science [Wissenschaft] is not excluded or de-
meaned, as Dilthey’s scientistic critics maintain. It has a central role—along
with art and ethics—in the formation [Bildung] and self-reflectiveness [Besin-
nung] of modern individuals in relation to the contingency of natural forces
and social conditions.
Dilthey remarked earlier in Life and Cognition (1892– 1893) that “thought,
which sets out to ultimately comprehend the universe, is bound to the transient
existence of organic life. Thought is fragile; it appears only at isolated points in
organic life and as such only at intervals as a temporary function. Everywhere it
appears as a part of life and in its service.”²⁸ Dilthey is pursuing here a natural-
istic strategy insofar as he analyzes how things emerge from contingent natural
conditions and circumstances and the common bodily sensuous schema of ani-
 SW II, p. 2.
 SW II, p. 2.
 SW II, p. 345.
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mal and human life. Thought strives to universalize itself, and the person to in-
dividuate herself in the context of these life-conditions. This universalizing from
out of the facticity and finitude of one’s situation and milieu is possible because
of the pre-conceptual felt self-reflexivity and the intensified self-reflectiveness in
which life turns back on itself and through which life becomes aware of itself,
articulating itself as a life.²⁹
The individuation and cultivation of a self occurs through an immanent in-
tercrossing movement, encompassing the natural-biological as well as the so-
cial-historical, toward the possibility of the ideal and potentially even the reli-
gious. It is here that the ethical, the individual other worthy of respect,
becomes visible within the context of the world and society. Dilthey described
this process of the becoming of knowledge as “a real natural epistemology.” It
requires an expansive conception of naturalness, without doctrinal naturalism’s
confinement of the phenomena, in contrast with its reductive and eliminative
forms.
VI Becoming a Self
Dilthey did not conclude his argumentation with the assertion of naturalness in
this expanded sense. Dilthey critically traced the boundaries of natural scientific
methods in the face of the felt reflexivity of the subject, the singular nexus of the
individual’s life [Individuation], and the inability of humans to know and com-
prehend life as a comprehensive universally valid systematic whole. Beginning
with naturalism as a general point of departure in his writings of the 1890s,
Dilthey immanently demonstrated its possibilities and limits in the context of
the psychological, historical, and ethical life of individuals while declining to
appeal to essentialist, religious, or metaphysical conceptions of a substantialized
self.
Dilthey’s project extends beyond the theory of knowledge as it is shaped by
the concern for recognizing and valuing an ethical individual self within the con-
text of the natural and social-historical determinants that appear to undermine
the identity of such a self. Dilthey does not consequently posit a self as an atom
of analysis outside the social, as Simmel charged, since Dilthey articulated the
individuation of a thoroughly relational self. Simmel dismantled this individual-
ity,which for Dilthey is not merely a theoretical thesis but a practical vocation, as
an undigested naturalistic remnant resisting full social mediation. There is nei-
 See Nelson 2011a.
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ther an unmediated individual nor an ahistorical biological organism in Dilthey.
He revealed how the self is expressed and cultivated only within and through the
immanent structures and conditions of social-historical life. The individual self
establishes itself and other selves as a universal value in and through this
nexus, as an intersectional point of intercrossing forces that extend beyond it
in processes of individuation.
Dilthey’s practical ethical orientation constituted the genuine turning point
from the natural to the human world. This transition from nature to spirit further-
more has its own epistemic conditions. While Dilthey naturalistically critiques
claims appealing to a non-interpreted immediate givenness and the direct self-
access and self-evidence of an unmediated “inner experience” or an unmediated
sensuous perception, which lead to problematic transcendent claims about real-
ity as a systematic totality, Dilthey critically—if minimalistically due to his rein-
terpretation of transcendental categories as embodied life-categories—confronts
naturalism with the reflexively and interpretively processed and mediated char-
acter of the given and the factical. Since facticity and givenness must be there-
for-me (there for a self) as lived-experiences are complex relational wholes in-
volving purposiveness, Dilthey concludes that they cannot be coherently and ad-
equately reduced to discrete “natural” elements abstracted from the complex
life-nexus.
Naturalism is the most fundamental worldview and the primary orientation
of modern science in Dilthey’sWeltanschauungslehre; but the contents of life and
objects themselves necessitate methodological pluralism and articulating reality
in more multifaceted and nuanced ways.
VII Psychology’s Mediating Role
Dilthey reinterprets epistemology as having a social, psychological, and biolog-
ical dimension that cannot be eliminated without distorting the activities, proc-
esses, and tasks of cognitive knowledge [Erkenntnis] in the context of articulating
and justifying ordinary and human scientific communicative understanding.
Dilthey challenges metaphysical and scientistic formalisms that interpret knowl-
edge to consist of worldless validity and value claims. The sense of actuality is
not a product of intellectual positing; it is shaped by the interaction of cognition
with feeling, instincts, and volitions that develop as a complex whole in a person
through experiences of resistance, limitation, and restraint.
“The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justi-
fication” (1890) illustrates how reality is neither a representationally constructed
phenomenal object nor an immediately given in intuition or inner experience.
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Reality as “there for me” is exhibited as immediate in empirical consciousness
through felt reflexive awareness [Innewerden]. This apparent immediacy is medi-
ated through biological drives, environmental adaptations, and practical inter-
ests formed through the play and work of impulse and resistance. Our sense
of reality presupposes the elemental interaction and mediation of self and
world prior to their differentiation; reality is irreducible to a worldless subject
or an unperceived and non-given object, to pure consciousness or materiality,
or their metaphysically reified manifestation as idealism and materialism.
Dilthey’s philosophical and psychological writings from the 1890s represent
a highly productive and controversial period in his intellectual development.
Dilthey’s endeavors to give both naturalistic and humanistic strategies their
due regard and reconceive epistemology through the methods and data of the
sciences, particularly history and psychology, led to the negative reaction of
both positivists and idealists. No aspect of his thought was more provocative
than his advocacy of a descriptive and analytic psychology as a “human science”
[Geisteswissenschaft], which was opposed by those who considered psychology
an exclusively naturalistic experimental science, including pioneering experi-
mental psychologists such as Ebbinghaus and Wundt who pursued reductionist
programs that uprooted individuals from their environing world and social exis-
tence. Dilthey’s critics included Neo-Kantian philosophers. Windelband and
Rickert protected the distinctiveness of the “cultural sciences,” as sciences of in-
dividual persons and ideal values, from naturalism by abandoning psychology
to the universalizing hypothetical-causal natural scientific explanations.
These debates continue to haunt later reflections on the possibility of a hu-
manistic or interpretive psychology. Dilthey’s contributions to these disputes
over the actuality of the self and its experiences of the world are worth reconsi-
dering for their historical significance, and—given the increasing albeit still too
limited appreciation for the social, historical, cultural, and aesthetic dimensions
of psychological inquiry—because we are perhaps in a better position today to
recognize the continuing relevance of Dilthey’s contextualizing epistemology
and individual-oriented interpretive psychology.³⁰
“The Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology” (1894), Dilthey’s most
controversial work, raised the ire of positivistic psychology (Ebbinghaus and
Wundt) and philosophers committed to a transcendental realm of validity and
value claims (Rickert and early Husserl). Dilthey articulates—through a complex
and nuanced reading of the psychological literature of his times—the possibility
of a descriptive and analytic (interpretive) psychology. He did not maintain an
 On the impure plural character of Dilthey’s psychology, see Nelson 2010.
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opposition of methods—understanding and explanation—and a duality of scien-
ces—natural and human. Dilthey does not advocate abandoning or bracketing
the causal nexus of reality; he reminds his readers that mechanical and efficient
causal explanation in the natural sciences construct an abstract causal nexus
linked by hypotheses and separated from the dense bonds and thick relations
of life’s effective nexus [Wirkungszusammenhang].
In kinship with Max Weber’s later conception of interpretive understanding,
relations of meaning and causal relations are mutually entangled. Neither one
dissolves the efficient causal and conditional nature of scientifically explainable
reality. Nowhere is the connectedness of meaning and causality more significant
than in the human sciences themselves. Dilthey consequently did not reduce
human scientific inquiry to pure interpretive understanding. Dilthey utilized
both efficient causal explanation and interpretive understanding in his psychol-
ogy as well as other human scientific strategies such as functional and structural
explanation of social and cultural systems.
Dilthey did not deny causality; he critiqued the misuses and abuses of cau-
sality in reductive empirical experimental psychology and scientism for the sake
of genuine scientific inquiry. Misch identified Hume as an important source for
Dilthey’s historical project. As with Hume’s moderate and life-nexus oriented
skepticism, which can be employed against dogmatic metaphysics and radical
skepticism, Dilthey interrogated the possibility of fathoming causal connections
to achieve certainty or metaphysical truth, whether this is materialist or idealist,
while articulating the social reproduction and transformation of meaning and
knowledge within the contexts of the daily communicative practices of everyday
life. Counter to justifying the sciences through an appeal to a transcendent real-
ity or transcendental conditions, Dilthey followed a Humean strategy of defend-
ing the sciences by skeptically abandoning exaggerated knowledge claims and
through the sciences’ anthropological-historical contextualization.³¹
Given the mediation involved in concrete individual life, psychology cannot
be appropriately understood as a subjective self-intuition and introspection. This
approach denies the facticity of life and mind, as mediated phenomena demand-
ing interpretation, and undermines psychology’s scientific—intersubjective and
universalizing—task. Nor is psychology adequate to its task of illuminating indi-
vidual human life if it is the collecting of discrete data—abstracted from and dis-
solving the life-nexus of individual and social life—externally reconstructed and
organized through causal hypotheses.
 This reading runs contrary to the account in Beiser 2012, p. 433.
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Objectifying third-person methods are useful in science but should be con-
textualized in a human-oriented psychology that recognizes the conditional, ne-
gotiated, and fragile unity and identity of the individual person and the person’s
interpretive, mediated, and self-reflexive life. Because of the multifaceted medi-
ation of the “acquired psychic nexus,” which as structured contrasts with an
atomistic bundle of elements and as acquired differs from the vision of an innate
intrinsic self, psychology cannot be merely descriptive but must also be analytic,
comparative, and structural. Structural psychology reveals the temporal enact-
ment of the categories of life in lived-experience and provides additional support
for his reinterpretation of epistemology and the human sciences in contrast with
movements that disregard empirical psychology.
Dilthey did not abandon this psychological program even as it became more
deeply hermeneutical in his later works. “Contributions to the Study of Individ-
uality” (1895–96) further articulates the comparative-morphological strategy of
elucidating individuality in its relational contexts. Through the hermeneutical
oscillation between singular and whole, both are further elucidated. Dilthey re-
jected Windelband’s Neo-Kantian model of the ideographic character of the cul-
tural sciences developed. Dilthey illustrated how (1) natural sciences such as as-
tronomy encompass an ideographic dimension and (2) the human sciences
presuppose and propose generalizing and systematizing claims that allow the ef-
fective life-nexus to be interpreted through the typical and the singular. It is in
such natural-historical contexts that the actual and not merely ideal individual
can be recognized and respected.
The world overflows the individual for Dilthey: “The infinite richness of life
unfolds itself in individual existence because of its relations to its milieu, other
humans and things. But every particular individual is also a crossing point of
contexts which move through and beyond its particular life …”³² The conditional
and situated yet meaningful and purposive individual person is the basic point
of departure and task for the human sciences and of Dilthey’s hermeneutical jus-
tification of methodological individualism against the radical collectivist tenden-
cies dominant in German cultural criticism and social theory.
Dilthey’s methodological individualism differs from other varieties because
it grasps the individual as a contextual historical reality rather than as a Hobbe-
sian fiction and allows for the use of social concepts. Social realities such as the
state, society, and community are given in experience and need to be interpreted
in order to understand social life. Their experiential givenness does not justify
positing them as independent much less metaphysical realities. Dilthey’s cri-
 DGS 7, p. 135.
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tique of reified notions of the spirit of the people [Volksgeist] and community [Ge-
meinschaft] for the sake of the relational yet distinctive individual, which was re-
formulated by Plessner in response to its fascistic forms, proved to be prescient.³³
VIII Naturally Interpreting Persons
Dilthey’s philosophy of the human sciences appears anti-naturalistic from the
perspective of an impoverishing and reified monistic naturalism. Dilthey’s
quasi-naturalism is such that the appropriate recognition of each object and
class of objects calls for recognition. It is methodologically pluralistic and op-
posed to the minimalistic naturalism of philosophers like Quine. From Quine’s
eliminative viewpoint, Dilthey would appear even more dogmatically empirical
in his defense of the unrestricted and unprejudiced empirical inquiry [unbefan-
gene Empirie] against empiricism and more laxly lenient and baroque than Car-
nap’s—from Quine’s perspective—overly tolerant logical positivism.
Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics places transcendent objects into suspicion
as being beyond the limits of cognitive knowledge. This critique does not extend
to phenomenal objects given in experience, all of which (natural and human) are
mediated. The mediation of each object does not entail a reduction to isolated
elements that suppresses their sense and significance. It requires that they be de-
scribed and analyzed as wholes. Although sciences are expressions of life, which
cannot escape life’s conditions, the human sciences are constituted in intersub-
jective relations by ethical and social-political interests in a way that distin-
guishes them from the natural sciences that rest more securely in the objectified
world.
Dilthey’s vision encompasses naturalism without being limited by it. His
strategies prefigure philosophical anthropology in Misch, Plessner, and Scheler.
This contextualized, nuanced, and tolerant form of historically contextualized
and liberated—as a human attitude and product—naturalism proceeds from
the natural-biological and anthropological conditions of human life through
their social-historical configurations to their unique intersection in the life,
self-reflection, and individuation of a conditional yet meaningful and purposive
nexus of an individual biographical life.
Heidegger construed Dilthey’s project as a flawed anti-naturalist personal-
ism and consequently a failed phenomenology that gave the naturalistic and sci-
 Plessner 1999.
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entific perspective too much purchase.³⁴ Dilthey’s works are an ambiguous
source for the new phenomenology, as Husserl noted in his defensive justifica-
tion in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” of the primacy of an absolute science
opposing all natural, anthropological-psychological, and social-historical condi-
tions and contexts.³⁵ Given their common sources in the descriptive and analytic
empiricist philosophy of Trendelenburg, Dilthey appreciated the description of
the emergence of higher forms of understanding, meaning, and validity descri-
bed in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and its tendency toward the a realist
worldly referentiality. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger learned from Dilthey’s psy-
chology and depiction of an immanent self-interpreting affective, worldly, and
historical life.³⁶
Dilthey’s project is incommensurable with the Neo-Kantian and phenomeno-
logical transcendental-ontological turn in philosophy. Dilthey did he bracket the
natural and the objective for the sake of a pure phenomenological starting point
that is independent of the social-historical life-nexus. He would not attempt to
replace metaphysics—placed in doubt by cultural-historical and epistemic-reflec-
tive critique and revealed to be more affective and individual than cognitive and
universal—with a new transcendental-ontological philosophy. Philosophy
should become a more modest project of critical reflectiveness that cannot aban-
don its close relations with either the natural and human sciences or with the
questions of practical life. The multiplicity of ways of life and worldviews is in
this context irrevocable.³⁷ Human life’s intercontextuality and the value of indi-
vidual personality are articulated through interdisciplinary human scientific re-
search. As von Aster noted, metaphysics is abandoned in Dilthey for philosoph-
ical anthropology and universal history.³⁸
Aster and Misch maintained that a philosophical reflection that informs and
is informed by the human sciences and modestly remains within the immanence
of nature and life is incompatible with the rehabilitation of the metaphysical,
theological, and transcendence in the phenomenology of the 1920s.³⁹ Misch de-
scribes how Dilthey’s anti-metaphysical critical philosophy directs us back to-
ward empirical life and its problems,while the new “life-philosophical” ontology
departs from that life to return to the metaphysical.⁴⁰ Dilthey’s advocacy of the
 Heidegger 1985, GA 20, p. 161. See Nelson 2013b.
 Husserl 1981.
 See Heidegger, GA 20, p. 161; Aster 1935, p. 149, 155.
 On Heidegger’s criticism of Dilthey’s “ontic pluralism,” see Nelson 2011b.
 Aster 1935, pp. 51–52, 103.
 Aster 1935, pp. 103– 104.
 Misch 1967, pp. 281–282.
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Enlightenment’s anti-metaphysical legacy and critical-positivist prioritization of
experience and the experiential sciences are sources of resistance to the powers
of authoritarianism and re-enchantment.⁴¹
IX Feeling and the Transformation of Nature in Dilthey’s
Aesthetics
Dilthey’s aesthetics provides another example of his resistance to enchantment
and critical appreciation of naturalism and modernity. Dilthey’s aesthetics has
been portrayed as a continuation of Romanticism that—due to the emphasis
on feeling, imagination, and the free responsiveness of the subject—is incompat-
ible with 19th century realism and naturalism. But in his aesthetic writings, par-
ticularly “The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task” (1892),
Dilthey emerged as a more sympathetic aesthetic theorist who criticized the lim-
itations while articulating the significance and possibilities of literary realism
and naturalism—e.g., modern artistic articulations of the naturalistic feeling
of life—against their Neo-Romantic detractors and the emergence of symbolist
spiritualism with its visionary enthusiasm.
Realism’s power lies in how it critically reveals the discrepancy between
outer appearance and internal reality, even as its weakness is its inability to re-
flectively generalize and interpretively focus on what is essential to evoking and
heightening the “feeling of life.” Rather than defending Romantic aesthetics and
rejecting naturalism and, naturalism is understood as achieving its truth when it
not only copies and reproduces but elucidates, intensifies, and transforms the
life it portrays. Dilthey reinterprets realism through the tension of reality and
feeling, resistance and will, and the objectivities of social life and lived-experi-
ence of the individual.
The naturalism of social novels expresses the emergence of a new style and
sensibility appropriate for the modern technological conditions of life that has
not yet achieved a “new inner form” for the work of art in relation to the subjec-
tivity of the artist and audience. Dilthey reinterpreted both romanticism and re-
alism as revealing two sides of the tensions of reality and feeling, resistance and
will, and the objectivities of social life in the relational context of individual
lived-experience.
Life-philosophically and hermeneutically interpreted, the aesthetic realism
and naturalism prove to be one-sided and incomplete in contrast to the expan-
 Misch 1967, pp. 281–282.
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sive and liberal unfolding of naturalism in Goethe. Dilthey emphasized the nat-
uralistic dimensions of Goethe and Schleiermacher, relying on them to formulate
his objections to narrow naturalism. Nonetheless, despite his criticisms, literary
naturalism and realism are more aesthetically promising for the “present task of
aesthetics” than the abandonment of the tension between reality and feeling in a
romantic literature that one-sidedly embraces organic vitality, intuitive vision,
and irrational feeling. Dilthey’ s critique of radical subjectivism in aesthetics il-
lustrates his wider hermeneutical empiricist strategy of critiquing idealism by re-
situating spirit within social-historical, psychological, and natural life-condi-
tions. Dilthey is accordingly an ambiguous heir to Romanticism and a critic of
its pathologies.
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Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung. Hamburg: Meiner, pp. 269–314.
Plessner, H. (1999) The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism. New York:
Prometheus.
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